Portrayal of the Egyptian Revolution in the Polish media by Brataniec, Katarzyna
Portrayal of the Egyptian Revolution 
in the Polish media
Katarzyna Brataniec
Wydział Psychologii i Nauk Humanistyczych 
Krakowskiej Akademii im. A. Frycza-Modrzewskiego 
D epartmen of Psychology and Humanities 
Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University
Abstract
The article describes political protests in Egypt from  the perspective o f the Polish press. The Arab 
Spring proved to be a breakthrough fo r  a completely different reason than previously thought. It did  
not bring about the democratization o f political life, extension o f civil rights or an increase in the 
freedom o f the Arab individuals and societies. Counter to what was expected, it resulted in partial 
dismantling o f social and political institutions, limitation o f civil rights and, above all, challenging o f  
the institutions o f the state as such. The Arab Spring exposed the weakness o f the state with regards to 
its legitimacy. Previously, researchers o f the region emphasized the Arab identity crisis and the con­
stant search fo r  a new formula fo r  the revival o f Muslim culture. They also gave hope fo r  the restora­
tion o f this identity to the extent that would allow fo r  an effective functioning o f the Arab societies in 
a globalized world and fo r  the strengthening o f national identities. As a result o f the revolution, the 
authority o f the president and the excessive power o f the police in Egypt were limited. This was fo l­
lowed by an increase o f anarchy and the paralysis o f the state. Consequently, the arm y seized power 
in the country and enforced stricter law: censorship o f the press and media was strengthened, further  
restrictions on the rights o f the individuals and the activities o f non-governmental organizations 
were introduced, while military courts fo r  civilians and a state o f emergency were upheld.
1. Introduction
The Egyptian Revolution has been present in the Polish press and media from  the very begin­
ning. Egypt is one of the m ost popular holiday destinations for the Poles. The educated Poles also 
appreciate the immense significance o f  the cultural heritage o f this country. However, this is not 
the only reason why Egyptian issues occupy an im portant place in the Polish media. M any politi­
cians see analogies between the Polish “Solidarity” movement from the 1980s and the national 
Egyptian uprising in January 2011. The issues of systemic change have a long tradition in Poland 
due to the transformational changes that occurred in the 1990s.
As rightly pointed out by Jerzy Wiatr: “The fate of the dem ocracy in the Arab states (and other 
Islamic countries) depends on whether there will exist strong democratic groups capable of effec­
tive action, which will be in favour o f  the secularism of the state. Their weakness makes the army 
the only protection against the flood of Islamic fundamentalism. The army, however, regardless
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of the intentions o f  its generals is not a democratic force. In the best case scenario, it acts as a 
mediator, as recently happened in Egypt.
Egypt, the largest Arab state, which in July 1952 m arked the beginning of a wave of revolu­
tions which eliminated inept and corrupt monarchies, is and will be o f  crucial significance for 
the future o f the dem ocracy in Islamic countries. Therefore, the twists and turns of the Egyptian 
revolution have implications reaching far beyond the scope of this state.3 .
At the beginning of my article I would like to briefly describe the Polish society, as our national 
identity as well as cultural and social determ inants significantly influence the perception of the 
events in Egypt. The m odern  Polish society is socially diverse, although ethnically homogeneous. 
Before the Second W orld War, we were a multi-ethnic, culturally diverse society. Apart from 
the Poles, about one-th ird  of this m ulti-ethnic and religiously diverse mosaic in the then Polish 
republic consisted prim arily o f  Jews, Germans, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Roma. Currently, 
the dom inant religion in Poland, declared by about 98% of Poles, is the Roman Catholicism in a 
decidedly conservative/folk form and far removed from the ecumenism o f Pope John Paul II and 
Pope Francis.
This Christian conservatism of the Church in Poland is extremely visible w hen it comes to the 
issues of gender, w om ens position in society, attitude to abortion and sexual life o f the believ­
ers, which -  according to the Polish church -  is to be focused solely on procreation. The status 
of the Catholic Church in Poland is extremely high, as since the end of World War II and during 
the influence o f the Soviet Union, the Polish church acted as the m ain institution of resistance 
against the com m unist regime and preserved national identity. This situation can be compared to 
the activity of Muslim clergy and the role o f Islam in Algeria during the French occupation of the 
country. Currently, Poland has only two significant political parties: the ruling liberal- centrist 
Civic Platform and the opposing right-wing/nationalistic Law and Justice. Although during the 
transition period after 1989 we had about three hundred  parties, the consolidation of the dem o­
cratic system brought the num ber of political parties down.
2. Polish Press
I would like to focus mainly on the Polish press, as the TV inform ation in Poland regarding the 
events o f the past three years in Egypt focused primarily on the dramatic and violent incidents 
w ithout fully depicting their political and cultural conditions. Balanced analyses appeared mainly 
in the socio -  political press.
Polish m ainstream  press: „Polityka”, „Tygodnik powszechny”, „Gazeta Wyborcza”, „Do rzeczy” 
and „Gazeta Polska”, emphasise this ideological division o f the Polish society, represented by the 
following opinion-form ing milieus:
• Liberal / leftist circles, which include progressive Catholics
• Rightist /  nationalistic circles, including conservative Catholics. Press titles associated with 
these two opposing world views are available to the m ain liberal and right-wing circles in the 
country, as well as to the political parties.
In the com m ents on the Egyptian revolution, one can see a clash o f  discourses regarding the Arab 
world, which have existed for a long time in the European intellectual traditions. In addition to 
the w orld view divisions typical for the contem porary Polish society, there are still three perspec­
tives in thinking of the M iddle East, stemming from W estern European ideas:
3 Jerzy J. Wiatr, Kryzys czy fiasko rewolucji arabskich?, “Myśl socjaldemokratyczna”, N r 1/ 2 2013, s. 56.
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• the perspective of civilisational superiority of the West (the Western orientalism described 
by Edward Said), namely the right, deeply-rooted in the European mindset, to assess all the 
events and processes taking place in the Arab world according to the paradigm of the civili­
sational and cultural superiority of the West and the inferiority of the East;
• the perspective confronting the final outcomes of the civilisation processes and mutual rela­
tionships between the West and the East, manifested in considering the consequences of col­
onization in the Middle East: delayed development, m odernisation, and above all, an in tra ­
civilisation split - a particular tension between tradition and m odernity  existing in Islam;
• (and finally) the perspective based on understanding and examining the internal dynamics 
of civilisation processes of Islamic societies.
The first perspective adds nothing new to our understanding of the Arab world. In fact, it is a 
reproduction of the commonplace prejudices and cultural stereotypes. It is, however, still present 
in the comments on the revolution in Egypt. It also means judging all the events of the revolution 
from the viewpoint of Western democracy and its standards. The second perspective „is detached 
from the views and judgements specific to one civilization, and recognizes the diversity of forms 
of perception and accounts of the history of o ther civilisations4.” It focuses particularly on the 
outcomes of Western European colonisation in its political, social, economic and cultural aspects. 
The colonisation of the Arab world, in addition to well-known political and economic effects, has 
increased its internal social conflicts, the Europeanisation of the elites and generated a civilisa­
tion conflict between the East and the West5. The th ird  perspective considers „the civilization 
as a state, a way of life for people of different cultures and nations” to be the starting point and 
recognises the diversity of the development of Arab societies and the values carried by the Islamic 
civilization in its internal dynamics as the m ain frame o f  reference .
In their assessment of the events in the Middle East, some political com mentators find it dif­
ficult to give up their Orientalist prejudices. Some researchers even speak about the creation 
of a new myth -  a neo-orientalism, which does not allow to adequately present the processes 
that are happening before our eyes. This myth presupposes that Islamic radicalism has only one 
side, predictable and known to all: the implacable hostility towards the West, the rejection of 
modernity and its achievements, the strict application o f  Sharia law in accordance with a literal 
interpretation of the Koran and the tradition, restrictions on the rights of individuals, especially 
those of women and religious minorities living among the followers of Islam. Furtherm ore, it 
feeds on the belief that Islamic political parties seek only to build some form of theocracy as soon 
as they gain power. Then -  as the advocates of this theory claim -  they will reject the democracy 
and show the world their true face. Public opinion in the West finds it very difficult to part with 
their perception of the East, accrued over centuries and sustained by the mass culture. In the 
Muslim socio-cultural magazine ,,As-Salam” published in Poland we read: „The images of crowds 
in the streets of Casablanca, Rabat, Tunis, Cairo or Benghazi, expressing their opposition to the 
authorities’ denial of basic liberties and political freedoms, guarantees of safety and development 
prospects are a proof that concepts such as citizenship, political subjectivity, autonomy and dig­
nity of the individual or the spirit of republicanism are not limited to one -  Western / European
4 Jan Kieniewicz, W prowadzenie do historii cywilizacji W schodu  i Zachodu, Dialog, Warszawa 2003, s. 
13.
5 Hieronim Kubiak, Europejskie transformacje i ich wpływ na zm iany cywilizacyjne współczesnego świata, 
„Krakowskie Studia M iędzynarodowe”, Arabska W iosna Rok Później. N um er 1, Kraków 2012, s. 27.
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-  cultural sphere, its traditions and historical experiences, but constitute a part of m uch broader, 
universal heritage and values which should be defended regardless of latitude, wealth, language, 
skin colour or religion.”6.
All political, social or cultural changes occurring in the Middle East will be associated with 
Islam, as it is the real source o f culture and identity for everyone inhabiting the circle of this civi­
lization. Therefore, we should not expect the Middle Eastern societies to renounce their religious 
roots in the nam e o f  secularism, which for W esterners is the foundation of freedom and dignity of 
the individual and is synonymous with progress. These values can be achieved and implemented 
in accordance with Muslim tradition7. Moreover, as the Moroccan writer Tahar Ben Jelloun said 
in an interview for “Gazeta Wyborcza”: „Democracy is no t owned by the Europeans. It is a uni­
versal system”. A nd he goes on to say, „There is no clash o f civilizations’, but a ‘clash of ignorance’”. 
There prevails an acute lack of knowledge about one another, which creates an insurmountable 
wall. And ignorance is accom panied by arrogance. The belief that one knows everything best 
does not encourage one to deepen one's knowledge about o ther religions and cultures.8
In my opinion, the best chance to explain the current situation is offered by the third perspec­
tive and the reconstruction of the Arab identity.
The shaping of the Arab identity after the colonial period  was based largely on the perceptions 
and myths that have never been implemented, and which were m ost fully expressed in pan- 
Arabism. The first o f  these was the m yth of the creation o f  one com m on Arab state, which would 
gather the scattered political entities on a single territory, under the guidance of a strong leader. 
In the 1960s, the pursuit of the political unity of the Arab world corresponded to the belief of 
the masses which recognized the Egyptian President Nasser as the undisputed leader of all Ar­
abs. This search for unity was supported by another belief, which assumed that the boundaries 
between individual Arab countries are artificial and designated by the European imperial policy 
employing the help o f  local regimes. It was this very m yth that Saddam Hussein referred to while 
trying to legitimize the attack on Kuwait and its partial annexation in 1990. The third notion 
rooted in the Arab m indset was the conviction of the existence of com m on political, social and 
economic interests of all Arab countries. The development o f oil monarchies ended even those 
hopes.9 It was then that the new concepts of unity  and solidarity of Arab societies appeared in 
the form  of religious revival and the recognition o f  Islam as the main element of identity and the 
foundation of community. In the light of Islamist ideology, Pan-Arabism and secularism were 
exposed as the tools o f  European colonialism and imperial policies of the United States. Reli­
gion was to become the foundation of the solidarity of Arab societies, reaching beyond national 
identification and referring to the existence of a spiritual com m unity of the Arab world. The 
nation-state was the product o f European history and the influence of W estern ideas. In contrast, 
according to the fundamentalists, authentic unity could only materialize in the form of umma -  a 
religious community, transcending the cultural and historical determ inants that constitute the 
Arab identity. Nowadays, Arab societies are experiencing conflict, the object of which is the shape
6 Bracia M uzułm anie. Neo-orientalizm  a m it islamskiego radykalizmu, “As-Salam”, n r  1, 2011, s. 3.
7 Katarzyna Brataniec, Niepewne losy rewolucji. Egipt, Maroko, Tunezja, Libia, “Zdanie” 2012, n r  1-2, s. 
75.
8 W ywiad Jolanty Kurskiej z m arokańskim  pisarzem, Kobieca rewolucja islamska, „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 
30.11-01.12.2013, s. 38.
9 Emanuel Sivan „Arab Nationalism  In the Age of the Islam Resurgence”, w: I. G ershoni, J.Jankowski [ed.] 
“R ethinking Nationalism  in the  Arab M iddle East”, h ttp://www.ciaonet.org/book/jankow ski/jankl l.h tm l
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of their identity. Despite the feeling of com m on fate and the political crisis caused by the U.S. 
policies in the region, some argue that there is no com m unity o f  Arab states, and talking about 
it is only a confirmation of the illusion. Each o f  the countries in the region has its own foreign 
policy either in cooperation with the United States or against them. The Arab countries are con­
nected solely through their language, and the only shared belief across the Arab world refers to a 
state of deep crisis, in which Arab societies presently are10.
M odern Arab states refer to a specific concept of the nation as a com m unity of beliefs, language 
and civilisation, expressed through the ideals of ethics11. This notion  rejects the understanding 
of the state functions limited solely to the political sphere. According to Islamic tradition, the 
idea of freedom has no place in the concept of the state and has no political or social significance. 
Symbols of freedom in this tradition have always equalled actions against the state. Such was the 
understanding of every m ovement transgressing the dom ain of the state: nomadism, tribalism 
and in the religious sense -  Sufism. The traditional societies preserved the balance between state 
and society, and autonomous groups had a margin of freedom. D uring the colonial expansion, 
this particular balance was destroyed, and every independent activity was eliminated in the name 
of building a strong state.
3. Colonial heritage
Having gained independence, most Arab countries preserved the post-colonial structures of p o ­
litical power in the form of advanced army, complex adm inistration and centralized com m uni­
cation. The Western m odernization of the Arab world resulted in reducing the freedom of its 
citizens and strengthening autocracy. The centralized state limited the dem ocratic participation 
of the public in politics. Colonial power structures accounted for the authoritarian dimension 
of the political modernization in the Arab world12. This dual heritage of European imperialism 
and autocratic reformism shaped the newly emerging political systems. They called themselves 
monarchies or republics governed in accordance with the will of the people, but the second half 
of the twentieth century replaced these systems with military regimes or one-party rule in almost 
the entire region. At the same time, this period was characterised by political stabilization and 
economic development. In Egypt, the regime was in power continuously since 1952, starting with 
the rule of Gamal Nasser, through Anwar Sadat to Hosni Mubarak. In Syria, the Al-Assad fam ­
ily has ruled since 1970. In Morocco, King M oham m ed VI has been the head of state since 1999, 
taking over the throne after his father, who ruled the country from 1961. In Libya, Gaddafi was a 
leader from 1969, and in Tunisia, Ben Ali has been in power since 1987. Jordan and Yemen also 
experience this continuity of leadership.
The regimes created their legitimacy by mobilizing society around the slogans of national unity, 
freedom, justice and development. Some of them focused on identifying an internal mission 
or on the defence of traditional values. They also applied the discourse o f  democratization and 
human rights. The validation of power was mainly based on the fear of political chaos and an 
Islamist takeover in case of their fall. Paradoxically, in Egypt, by denying the citizens the right to 
participate in the political life, the regime strengthened the authority of the Islamic establishment
10 ,,A1-Ahram Weekly”, April 24-30; May 15-21, 2003.
i 1 Nazih N. Ayubi „Over-staling The Arab State. Politics and Society in the M iddle East”, I. B. Tauris Pub ­
lishers, London New York 2001, s. 19.
12 John O. Voll, „Islam and Dem ocracy; Is M odernization a Barrier” w: Sh. Hunter, T.Malik, „M oderniza ­
tion, Dem ocracy and Islam, W estport 2005, s. 91
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in the public sphere. M ubarak also allowed religious institutions to control the judicial system 
and the society through passing a law regarding defamation of religion13. In the Arab world, p o ­
litical parties are weak, although in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen, governments 
opened up to a m ulti-party  system. However, it served m ore to maintain the illusion of political 
pluralism rather than genuine political freedom. M ulti-party system in the Arab world strength­
ened, in fact, the power of the ruling party. It was an authoritarian rule with a democratic facade. 
In Egypt, the National Dem ocratic Party was in power from 1978, although there were 24 par­
ties operating legally14. In the liberal opinion-form ing circles, culturally and politically oriented 
towards Europe, there dominates a positive perception of changes which began with the revolu­
tion in 2011, although it is no t free from the anxiety about the fate of the democratic processes 
in Egypt. At this point I would like to present the main elements of this discourse. I want to pay 
particular attention to them  also because liberal magazines in Poland are free from prejudice and 
in m y opinion provide reliable inform ation about the situation.
4. “Polityka” magazine
Patrycja Sasnal (an analyst in the Polish Institute of International Affairs) “Pharaoh takes off his 
mask. The new president was elected, but the army will continue to rule the country. The Egyp­
tian army is one of the largest cross-industry corporations today.” “Polityka” no. 26, 27 June-03 
July 2012. Marshal Tantawi became the tem porary head of state. In this article the author focuses 
on the social dim ension of an authoritarian state. She claims that the Egyptian society is authori­
tarian and “replicates the style o f  M ubarak’s rule at home, at work, in the street. This behaviour 
is enhanced by patriarchy -  in everyday life it is the father who makes the decisions, while the 
tender m other remains silent.” Egyptian Family restricts personal freedom and individual rights. 
According to Sasnal, the education system is similarly based on obedience and lack of any creativ­
ity. “Social change in Egypt has not yet caught up with political change.”
Patrycja Sasnal “The Brothers divide the Family” “Polityka”, no. 50, 12-18 December 2012. “Ev­
erything is ready. Egypt under the rule of M ohammed Morsi is once again on the verge of revolu­
tion. The new president, assuming power, led the Egyptians to the streets.” Morsi has been called 
the “second dictator” and “shed the image of the president who is at the mercy of the army by 
having two of its heads retire. In return, he left alone the immense estates of the army, and the 
new draft of the constitution does not assume civilian control over the military forces. Hence, the 
Arm y moved to the back seat and quietly remains on good terms with the Brotherhood.” In her 
words: “Many Egyptians boycott the civilian production of the army in protest against its secretive 
dual power.” Officers were relieved to see the Freedom and Justice Party take responsibility for the 
condition of the State. “M ubarak has disgraced capitalism to the point that today some Egyptians 
turn  to socialism.” Patrycja Sasnal ends her article by stating that the second revolution in Egypt is 
inevitable, because the social divisions have intensified, the sense of security among the Egyptians 
has declined drastically, the police has disappeared from the streets, and the economic situation 
of the country is disastrous. Meanwhile, Morsi called for a referendum on the draft of the new 
constitution with a strong position of the president (the referendum on December 15).
13 Policing Belief: The Im pact o f  Blasphemy I.aws on H um an Rights”, Freedom House Report, Oclobcr 
201 0 .
14 Emad El-D in Shahin, „Political Parties in Egypt: Alive, but Not Kicking” w: Kay Lawson, Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim  [ed]., „Political Parties and D em ocracy”, Vol. V, The Arab W orld, Praeger, Santa Barbara, Cali­
fornia, Denver C olorado, Oxford England 2010, s. 9.
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„Egypt is putting its head in a noose. The disgruntled in the streets of Egyptian cities have called 
for military assistance, as they were disappointed by their democratically elected Islamist govern­
ment. They may soon regret it” is the title of A rtur Domoslawski's article in one of the opinion- 
forming weekly „Polityka”, no. 28/2013, 10-16 July
Domoslawski admits that the Brothers contributed to social discontent and mass criticism, and 
yet he doubts whether it was justified to call the army to overthrow the first democratically elect­
ed president in the history of Egypt. The Polish com mentators felt that the decision of the Egyp­
tian society is completely incomprehensible. W hy did the young Egyptian dem ocracy voluntarily 
impose on itself a restriction in form of the control of the army? Is a dem ocracy fashioned by the 
army becoming the norm? W hy does the society let the army use violence and repression against 
its political opponents? And if the next government disappoints a large num ber of people, will 
the military take control yet again?
Polish commentators do not understand the respect the Egyptian society feels for the army. 
Democracy does not allow a coup. Signatures collected by Tamarod are not impressive.
Domoslawski writes: “Some Egyptians believed the propaganda of the old regime claiming that 
as soon as the Brothers come to power, they will turn  Egypt into a religious state. A year o f  the 
Islamist rule of M oham m ed Morsi did not confirm these fears. O verthrown by the army, Morsi 
committed several extremely grave sins in politics, though of a completely different category.” 
Domoslawski is wrong, because it was Morsis rule that created the version of the constitution, 
in which the Salafists of al-Nour insisted on Article 219, turning Egypt into a religious state. He 
emphasises, however, the incompetence in the adm inistration of the state, unresolved economic 
problems and social crisis. Domoslawski highlights the fact that the Brothers -  successful in 
charitable activities (for example, the earthquake in Cairo in 1992 and the extraordinary m o ­
bilization of syndicates of doctors and engineers) -  “could not replace the experience of social 
work with any state policy that would give hope for the future.” Furtherm ore, in his opinion, 
Morsi broke the underlying principle of the Brothers regarding politics and used violence against 
his political opponents after the announcem ent of the decree providing him  with im m unity  in 
November and December 2012, and the riots which this decree induced. Domoslawski believes 
that the Brothers represent the non-liberal democracy trend, namely they disregard the rights of 
religious minorities and discriminate on grounds of gender, religion, language, health condition 
and social status. The main accusation made by the Brothers against the opposition concerned 
its glorification of the rights of religious minorities and freedom of speech with the simultaneous 
disregard for the will of the voters, an issue which is still audible in successive dem onstrations 
against Sisis government.
Łukasz Wójcik: “Dangerous straitjacket”, “Polityka”, no. 29, 17-23 July 2013: “The fall of the 
Islamists in Egypt will be of trem endous significance for the future of political Islam in the whole 
region. After all, Islamists’ reconciliation with dem ocracy was one of the most im portant changes 
in recent years in the Middle East. This was made possible largely due to the Egyptian Brother­
hood, which in the 1970s first renounced violence, and two years ago, taking advantage of the 
fall of their his sworn enemy Hosni Mubarak, entered the realm of official politics. Now, the 
way Islamists in other countries of the region will act depends to a large extent on the fate o f the 
Egyptian Brotherhood. And for the time being, the Brotherhood has chosen a direction of the 
head-on collision.”15
„Islam has become a useful excuse for both sides of the conflict in Egypt. The Army gained a
15 Łukasz Wójcik Niebezpieczny kat'tan bezpieczeństwa, „Polityka”, n r  29, 17.07-23.07.2013, s. 41.
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tacit approval o f  the West for its activities, explaining that it took the power away from the fun­
damentalists. For the Brothers, on the other hand, it is convenient now to argue that they have 
become m artyrs for their faith, although they did develop disastrous economic and social poli­
cies and it was because o f  that -  not because of religion -  that millions of Egyptians wanted to 
take their power away.” Wójcik indicates that Morsi constituted a serious threat to all authoritar­
ian Arab regimes, firstly, because he was democratically elected and spoke on behalf of millions 
of Arabs, and secondly, as he openly criticized them  for „stifling national democratic aspirations.” 
Therefore, after his fall, Saudi Arabia supported the military government with billions of dollars 
in loans. According to the commentator, the greatest achievement of the Brothers was the renun ­
ciation of violence and active participation in politics within the democratic system. It would be 
a pity if this process were compromised.
“Sisi, the son of Nasser”, “Polityka”, no. 35,28 August-03 September 2013, the headline says: “Af­
ter the recent tragic events in Cairo, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi became the hero of liberal Egypt. 
Even though he was brought to power by the Islamists”. Patrycja Sasnal argues that “the Egyptians, 
always susceptible to the cult of the individual, have a leader yet again, a father and master in one 
person.” O n the other hand, even “the liberal cream of the Egyptian society anointed Sisi to be 
the leader, starting with writers, actors, to philosophers.” The author indicates num erous parallels 
between Sisi and Nasser: their charisma, the application of street dialect in their speeches, the use 
of al-Azhar to legitimize the military power in the country, as well as violence and repressions 
against the Islamists. She also talks about the form ation of a new alliance of non-democratic 
countries in the region: Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, along with Russia and China.
5. “Gazeta Wyborcza” newspaper
Thursday, 4 July 2013. Robert Stefanicki “The Coup in Egypt. M oham m ed Morsi is no longer the 
president. There will be a new civilian government, though at the army's bidding.” The constitu­
tion was suspended, and a plan of tem porary seizure of power was discussed with a num ber of 
political groups. Stefanicki emphasises that Morsi was the first president elected in free elections, 
and the first Islamist to lead a dem ocratic Arab state. “Over the last year, through its incompe­
tence and greed, the Brotherhood, the strongest political organization in the country, embezzled 
the capital of social trust, accumulated over the period of 60 years o f  persecution from the hands 
of the army.” In a survey conducted by the Ibn Khaldun Centre for Development Studies in Cairo, 
82% of respondents were in favour of the army s return to power. Wyborcza's com m ent refers to 
the words of an Egyptian blogger: “The Egyptians are facing a difficult choice between a junta 
and a theocratic dictatorship. We deserve more, but we were not able to work out a better alterna­
tive.”
Friday 5 July 2013, M arta Urzędowska “Army rules Egypt”. “Adli Mansur is to rule tem porar­
ily, and his function is likely to be purely symbolic, because in reality it was the army that seized 
the power.” “... The army is doing everything to deprive the infuriated Islamists of their leaders. 
W arrants have been issued for the arrest o f hundreds of im portant activists of the Brotherhood 
and their leader -  M oham m ed Badi -  has already been arrested.” As a com m entary on these 
events, Urzędowska interviewed Yasser El-Shima, an analyst from the International Crisis Group 
in Cairo. In his opinion, it is difficult to stabilize the country if the Islamists removed from power 
are no t involved in the process o f  forming a new government. “Should the Muslim Brotherhood 
be persecuted yet again, as it was during Mubarak’s rule, should they be im prisoned or detained 
w ithout charge anew, it would be a massive step backwards and a great tragedy for the dem ocra­
tization process, or even for the stability of Egypt.”
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6. Social democratic thought
In his article “Crisis or failure of the Arab revolutions”16, Jerzy W iatr notes that the policy of 
Western intervention in the internal affairs of Arab countries has proven to b e  u n s u c c e s s f u l  as it 
is impossible to create dem ocracy through military intervention. Roman Kuźniar, a Polish politi­
cal scientist, accused such actions of “abandonm ent of morality in favour of the easy rhetoric of 
human rights.”17 Wiatr indicates the following factors relevant to the development o f events in 
the Arab world and in Egypt, which have contributed to the outbreak of the revolution: dem o­
graphic changes, the increasing influence of education and educational success experienced by 
these societies, the role of the young generation and its sensitivity to democratic ideas, a kind of 
diffusion of these the ideas resulting from the th ird wave of democratization and the awareness 
of the corruption of existing governments.
Wiatr cites the oft-quoted words of Zbigniew Brzeziński: “In Egypt, we will have a state ruled 
either by religious fundamentalists or by the military.”18 Thus, he opts for the idea, popular in 
the West and supported by authoritarian regimes, that as a matter o f  fact, dictatorships protected 
the Muslim society against Islamic radicalism. According to Wiatr, religious fundam entalism  is 
incompatible with dem ocracy and respecting the rights of minorities within it. Only a secular or 
ideologically neutral state can provide the conditions for the coexistence o f  the diverse ethnic and 
religious groups. He adds: “Christian Europe needed a few centuries in order to to understand 
and accept this principle, though even here one can sometimes see how difficult it is to imple­
ment this principle in practice.”19
The Polish press features all these three perspectives, so depending on the editorial assum p­
tions there dominates a paternalistic approach or the one taking into account the civilisational 
autonomy of the Arab world. A completely different perception of the role of the Muslim Broth­
erhood is presented by the right-wing press, which in its evaluation of the events of the Egyptian 
revolution often falls into the trap of not only Orientalism, but even o f Christian fundamentalism. 
I do not intend to spend too m uch time on this discourse as I consider it an expression of preju­
dice and xenophobia, which you will see for yourselves. I am also forced to tone down some of 
the wording as I do not want to embarrass myself.
7. Right-wing press
The extreme attitudes towards the Islamic civilisation, referring directly to medieval prejudices 
and teachings of the Church Fathers are reflected on the pages of the right-wing press. Starting 
from the Middle Ages, European civilization has remained primarily Christian and it was the 
religious differences that determined the context of perceiving such distinct cultures as Islam. 
The Church Fathers -  John of Damascus, Peter the Venerable and Thomas Aquinas -  formulated 
interpretations of Islam which were binding for many centuries. They considered Islam as heresy, 
the creation o f  a man who used a fake revelation in order to gain power20. They pointed to the
16 Jerzy J. Wiatr, Kryzys czy fiasko rewolucji arabskich?, „Myśl socjaldemokratyczna”, N r 1/2 2013.
17 Roman Kuźniar, N ieznośna lekkość zabijania, Gazeta Wyborcza, 17-18 grudnia, 2011.
18 Zbigniew Brzeziński, Szach królowej, „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 5 -6  listopada 2011 cyt. za: Jerzy J. Wiatr, Kry­
zys czy fiasko rewolucji arabskich?, „Myśl socjaldemokratyczna”, Nr 1/2 2013.
19 Jerzy j. wiatr, dz. cyt., s. 55.
20 R.W. Southern, W estern Views o f  Islam in the Middle Ages, H arvard University Press, Cam bridge -  
Massachusetts -  London 1978, s. 38.
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practical, not spiritual dim ension of Isiam: lack o f miracles in M uhammad's activities, excessive 
attachm ent to worldly possessi<\ii and a sensual idea of Paradise. The image o f  Islamic paradise 
made Christians believe that Islam is a religion devoid of a spiritual or supernatural dimension. 
The depicted vivid description of Muslim Paradise contrasted with ascetic Christian ideas.
For them, Islam was a parody of Christianity, an inadequate copy of its practices and rituals. It 
was criticized for the doctrine of the holy war and violence against infidels. These old ideas are re ­
ferred to by Tomasz P. Terlikowski, a Catholic columnist in „Do rzeczy” magazine (which means 
“to the po in t” but should rather be called “nonsense”), no. 17, 20-26 May 2013, in his article titled 
“Taming o f  the Islamic lion”, which represents the right-wing discourse and constitutes the es­
sence o f Catholic fundamentalism and its understanding of Islam. He regards Islam as a religion 
with contem pt as well as any attempts at dialogue and cooperation, going as far as criticising the 
ecumenical policies o f John Paul II and Pope Francis. It is w orth quoting a few elements of this 
discourse:
According to this Catholic publicist, the Crusades and the Reconquista in Spain were necessary 
actions o f Christians against the power o f  Islam, a battle for living space and a defence against 
persecutions by the Muslims. Terlikowski consistently negates the coexistence of the two religions 
in Andalusia calling this historical period “a m yth of peaceful cooperation”. “The power of the 
West and the fall of Islamic superpowers later caught the West off guard, and the new strategy of 
Muslims, who replaced the army of warriors with an army of wom en having children in the West, 
m ade the Europeans forget about “the m issionary nature of Islam” and the fact that its purpose is 
to subjugate the whole earth.” He goes on to say: “the gesture of John Paul II, who kissed the holy 
book  of Islam, has m ade it increasingly difficult to talk about the “falseness” of this holy book”. 
However, Terlikowski does no t give up and continues: “But in fact, from a Christian perspective, 
it is difficult to look at Islam and its holy book as anything other than false”. “The teachings of the 
Koran are, however, a regress not only from the Christian, but also Jewish perspective”. Quote: 
“The God of the Koran - [ . . . ]  is not and can not be close to his followers”. And another quote as a 
sum m ary: “Islamism, as well as Islam (although one needs to be aware of the difference between 
the two), should therefore be considered to be a threat also to the Church and to the Western 
civilization, in the same way that com m unism  or Nazism once were (radical fundamentalism, in 
facts, draws from  both). W hich means that it is necessary not only to minutely analyse the an ­
thropological and religious principles o f  this religion and its political branch, but also to indicate 
how they may im pact the social life and how the Christians should defy it”. Unfortunately, this 
Catholic fundam entalist considers Islam be one of the m ost serious threats to Christianity in the 
twenty-first century and places Islam in the same category as relativism, aggressive secularism, 
civilisation o f  death and gender ideology21. He sees the com ing to power of the Muslim Brothers 
and their policy of confrontation with the Copts in Egypt as synonymous with religious war .
“Do rzeczy” no. 30, 19-25 August 2013, Jacek Przybylski talks to Frederik Encel, a French ex­
pert on the Middle East, in an interview entitled: “There will be no safety under the Pyramids”. 
Right after the tragic events in Tahrir, Encel prophesies that Egypt “is rapidly approaching a fully 
fledged civil war”. He compares the situation in Egypt to the Algerian conflict in the 1990s.
„Gazeta Polska”, 10 July 2013, Antoni Rybczyński: “How the arm y stopped Islamization” de­
scribes the reasons why Morsi lost his power and the withdrawal of public support for the Broth­
ers. “Gazeta Polska”, 08 July 2013, Krzysztof Warecki (in his article) „Egypt faces power struggle. 
After the overthrow of Morsi / The Muslim Brotherhood does no t know the concept of com ­
21 Tomasz P. Terlikowski „Oswajanie islamskiego lwa”, „Do rzeczy”, n r  17 20-26 maja 2013, s. 75-76.
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prom ise”, clearly regards the Brothers’ rule in Egypt as the introduction of principles o f radical 
Islamic elements. The Brothers applied the democracy in an instrum ental way in order to impose 
their authority on the entire society. “Gazeta Polska” highlights the Brothers’ attitude towards the 
Egyptian Christians and their persecution. It treats the support of Obama's adm inistration for 
the Muslim Brothers as an expression of ideological indoctrination and his leftist beliefs. Warecki 
advocates decisive actions by the Egyptian army so as to stop the violence and prevent anarchy. 
He quotes a statement by the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry: “W hat we had in Egypt was an 
exceptional situation, which became a question of life or death, threatening with the outbreak of 
a civil war and extensive violence, whereas now we are dealing with a rapidly progressing consti­
tutional process”. “Gazeta Polska” in a way justifies the military actions as the Brothers “blindly 
refer to the electoral legitimacy” and use violence against their opponents. Because their actions 
constitute a threat to the state security, they will no longer be tolerated by the army”.22
8. Women during the revolution
The Polish press has devoted quite a lot of space to the womens role in the Egyptian revolution, 
recognizing their unique role in the protests against authoritarian rule, their participation in 
demonstrations and their experience of violence at the hands of the police and security services.
Agnieszka Krzemińska, “Break the bracelets! The Egyptian upheaval is to lead to political, but 
also social changes. Will women benefit from it, so far living in the shadow of m en?”, “Polityka”, 
no. 13-26 March, 2011. The author emphasizes the low social status of the Egyptian w om en and 
the deep social division that they experience -  into the educated residents of the cities and the 
illiterate village inhabitants with no prospects for the future. O n the one hand, Egyptian feminists 
are fighting for a shift in social awareness: a departure from the infibulation procedures and a 
greater participation of women in public life. O n the other hand, despite the 2008 ban, about 90% 
of women still become circumcised, and the power of tradition is not decreasing, as evidenced by 
the data from 2009 mentioning 2.7 thousand suicide attempts made by educated women because 
of their spinsterhood.
Artur Domoslawski (“Egyptian suffragists”, “Polityka”, no. 10, 7-13 March 2012) referring to 
Shahinda Miqlad, claims that wom en “have been and will be in the vanguard o f  the fight for 
rights in Egypt” -  not only womens rights, but hum an and civil rights as well. During the revo­
lution, the women of Egypt declared a full-scale war against sexual harassment and this -  ac­
cording to Hoda Elsadda -  resulted in an improvement in the situation in the streets o f  Cairo. 
Domoslawski emphasises that the wave of political Islam strengthened the Islamic feminism, 
namely the movement of devout Muslim women, for whom  Islam is a religion of equality be ­
tween men and women.
Marta Urzędowska (“Gazeta Wyborcza”, 09-10 June 2012, “W omen o f  Tahrir betrayed by the 
Egyptian revolution”): “Just like men, they fought with the police, they were arrested, humiliated 
and tortured.” However, only a few w omen entered the parliament, though there were hundreds 
of female candidates. The author points out that 70% of the new MPs are Islamists “for w hom  the 
place of women is at home, not in politics.”
“Gazeta Wyborcza” 31 December 2012-January 1, 2013, M arta Urzędowska “The strength of 
Muslim Sisters”. It is estimated that “the expanding Muslim Brotherhood has about one to one 
and a half million members, at least half o f  whom  are women”. D uring the election campaign, 
women were mainly occupied with recruiting the voters. However, according to the rules prevail­
22 Krzysztof Warecki, „Gazeta Polska”, 07.08.2013, s. 17.
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ing am ong the Brothers, w om en should not occupy significant public positions or serve im por­
tant functions in the Brotherhood. O n the basis of her interviews, M arta Urz^dowska argues that 
being a Sister “is an unofficial position” -  w om en are mainly focused on propagating the princi­
ples of Islam and on social work, they do not contribute to the funds. A num ber of them joined 
the Freedom and Justice Party, which “organized workshops to teach them  how to run  an election 
campaign and contact the media.” According to the author of the article, such a large proportion 
of w om en in the organization results from the political persecution of the Brothers. W hen men 
were sent to prisons, it was the w omen that took care of the continuity o f  the organization. “Since 
they have never been treated as a serious threat by the regime, they able to operate more freely.” 
Which, of course, radically changed after the overthrow of President Morsi, evidenced -  among 
other things -  by the verdict of 28 November 2013, w hich sentenced 21 girls to 11 years in prison 
for peaceful dem onstration supporting Morsi23. There is a newly established youth branch of the 
party, called Nur, at the Ain Shams university. Its aim is to prom ote the knowledge of Islam and 
to take care o f the problem s of female students, e.g. improving the conditions in the dormitories 
and security on cam pus24.
Having won the elections, the elected representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood paid a cour­
tesy visit to Poland, which took place from 22 to 27 March 2012. Their purpose was to gather 
inform ation about the Polish structural changes after 1989. They were particularly interested in 
the issue of withdrawal of the military power in Poland. This visit received no attention either 
from the Polish or from  the Egyptian press.
9. Conclusion
Edward Said believes that the greatest progress that has been m ade in the contemporary theory of 
culture is the belief that cultures constitute a heterogeneous mix and are interrelated and m utu ­
ally interdependent.25 Any attempt at unification or creation of insurm ountable barriers between 
civilisations contradict the hum an experience of history and contributes to the impoverishment 
o f individual cultures: speaking of ‘“W estern civilization’ means supporting the ideological fic­
tion suggesting a certain im partial superiority of some values and ideas, none of which really 
m atter outside o f  history conquest, immigration, travel and mixing of peoples, which provided 
the Western nations with their present mixed identity.”26 Every division of cultures and peoples, 
according to Said, is responsible for the false representations and misstatements, and more im ­
portantly, identifies the differences between people with hostility, which in turn results in wars 
and imperial control.
However, the revolution in Egypt has not been completed. Some say it has come full circle 
and once again the arm y is in power, and its new face is general Sisi. The army skillfully fuels the 
hostility towards the Brothers and their supporters. However, in my opinion, the biggest problem 
lies in the sharp division of the Egyptian society into three groups:
• those who accept the situation and the role the army plays in the changes that have no pre-
23 M uham m ad  M ansour, Rough justice: 21 girls sentenced to 11 years for peaceful protests, “Egypt In ­
dependent”, 28.11.2013, http://w w w .egyptindependent.com ./new s/rough-justice-21 -girls-sentenced 
[06.12.2013]
24 M arta  Urzędowska, Siła Sióstr M uzulmanek, „Gazeta Wyborcza" 31 grudn ia  2012-1 stycznia 2013, s. 8.
25 E. W. Saida, O rientalizm , Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2005, s. 476.
26  Tamże.
52
dictable outcome -  perhaps to preserve the authority and power of the army, as in their opin ­
ion there is no alternative;
• those who definitely want the political democratization of the country  and the abolishment 
of military dictatorship;
• and finally those who fervently support the Islamic ideals created by the Muslim Brother­
hood and the Salafists.
All three groups consist of Muslims and they do not question the Islamic foundations of the 
Egyptian society. The dispute revolves around the understanding of Islam. O n the one hand, as a 
cultural and civilisational project, heritage and values, which include contributions by the Copts 
and other religious minorities living in Egypt, and on the other hand, as the regulation and the 
only source of rights for all citizens, which is heading towards a religious state. The debate, which 
takes place not only in Egypt but throughout the Muslim world bears the hallmarks of an in tra ­
civilisation clash which was long noted by Piotr Klodkowski and Jerzy Zdanowski.
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